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Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University
1 (GRC) exemplifies a rare breed of judicial opinion: one that has become a proverbial canary in a coal mine. It presaged what is emerging as the dominant question related to state regulation of sexuality for the next decade: the tension between lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) equality claims and claims to religious liberty.
In GRC, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled both that a Roman Catholic university had to provide equal material benefits to gay student organizations, and that those organizations could be required to declare on stationery and in publications that the university did not endorse their activities. By doing so, the court granted victory to Georgetown University on expressive grounds and to the Gay Rights Coalition on equality grounds. In the end, both parties claimed victory. 2 It is tempting to attribute this Solomonic and seemingly happy ending to the court's deft accommodation of the two worldviews represented in the case. The decision exemplifies reliance on pluralism as the central lodestar for navigating factionalism in the modern democratic state. The court built its resolution on an amicus brief from a Wisconsin civil rights agency that had suggested the specific compromise, 3 adding an elaborate doctrinal path to reach its result. The decision has become something of a poster child for judicial minimalism: a model of wisdom, pragmatism, and statesmanship. 4 The opinion in GRC was the first by a court of last resort to establish parameters for accommodating religious belief in the context of enforcing civil rights protections for gay plaintiffs. It will not, however, be the last. Today the volume of sexual orientation equality claims has dramatically increased. When the complaint in the Georgetown case was filed in 1979, the District of Columbia was the only state-level jurisdiction that prohibited anti-gay discrimination. 5 When the case was decided nine years later, only Wisconsin had joined D.C. in banning sexual orientation discrimination. 6 Today, antidiscrimination laws in twenty one states plus the District of Columbia contain this prohibition.
The GRC litigation was a particularly turbulent outing over those shoals, and it offers lessons for contemporary debates. The D.C. court's opinion also provides an apt beginning point for situating current LGBT equality versus religious liberty debates in a broader set of questions concerning the role of courts in navigating treacherous cultural terrain. This article re-examines the GRC decision with these two goals in mind and explores how it illuminates deficiencies in both doctrine and political theory.
The article is divided roughly in half between analysis of doctrine and of theory. I first critique the GRC decision doctrinally, focusing on the court's grappling with the expressive components of the two identities and the uncertainties surrounding the distinction between recognition and endorsement. GRC was a particularly challenging dispute to resolve because of the then-new shifts in social meaning-that is, perceptions of the causes, consequences and normative valence of certain beliefs and conduct-that confronted the court at several levels of its analysis. I then update its analysis by examining how the Supreme Court in the years since GRC has dealt with the same doctrinal questions, identifying the inadequacies that remain. From there, I analyze a series of more theoretical problems that lay beneath the surface of a pluralist and minimalist approach to judging, including the proper role of courts, the problematic social meaning of antidiscrimination law, and the indeterminacy of both pluralist and religious belief systems.
More specifically, the order is as follows: In Part II, I tell the story of the GRC case and explain why it resonates so closely with current and likely future cases involving the conflict between gay equality and religious liberty. Simply put, three distinct dynamics converge in this category of cases:
• A conflict between two groups or representative parties driven by strong belief systems; • A factual context in which questions of sexual morality are central; and • A legal framework of antidiscrimination statutes. These factors tend to trigger emotional responses that impede a proper weighing of the interests in contestation. Their cultural volatility also obscures the evolving social meanings that attach to each one of the three, thus greatly complicating the adjudicatory function. Disaggregating these points of tension is the first step in understanding the complex doctrinal mechanics in cases like GRC.
I criticize the GRC court for its too-easy acceptance of the University's argument that its capacity to communicate adherence to Roman Catholic tenets on homosexuality would be irreparably spoiled by the presence of a gay student group. The court based its finding that the University violated the D.C. antidiscrimination law on evidence that the school's spoliation argument was tainted by stereotyping the student group as necessarily asserting support for every position in an imagined "gay agenda," including hostility to religion. 16 This finding effectively limited the holding to the particular facts of the case. Where the court fell short, I argue, was in its failure to impose a duty on the larger, more powerful expressive actor to mitigate any harm to its message by assuming the burden to dissociate itself from the student group by engaging in more speech.
Part III explores cases in which the Supreme Court has confronted the central questions present in GRC since that case was decided. I focus on two themes. The first is whether an expressive institution's tolerance of the presence of an actor with a contrary message that contradicts the institutional speaker's message constitutes endorsement by the institution of that actor. Second, I trace how the Court has grappled with the inseparability of a status characteristic and a related expressive message.
I conclude that the law on both points remains unclear, but that it is also in motion. The Court has both deferred too easily to an expressive institution's spoliation argument (repeating the mistake in GRC), 17 and, more recently, insisted on a duty to mitigate expressive harm by dissociation. 18 When presented with an argument that lesbian, gay, or bisexual status, implicated by an antidiscrimination rule covering sexual orientation, could be separated from beliefs about the morality of homosexual conduct, the Court rejected the proposition that the two could be readily distinguished. 19 Yet the Justices have not analyzed, or even fully engaged with, the complexities of expressive identity-based conflicts.
Part IV builds on the doctrinal analysis in Parts II and III and begins the shift to a more theoretical orientation. In Part IV, I argue for a substantial modification of the weight given to minimalist adjudication techniques-the "passive virtues" -that have garnered widespread support by scholars commenting on the judicial role in the culture wars. I propose three interpretive guidelines for lawmakers and lower courts confronted with conflicting normative visions: a default principle that civil obedience is ideologically neutral; a lodestar of enhancing voice and discouraging exit; and a commitment to protecting the right to dissent from the antidiscrimination principle.
In Part V, I explore the social meaning of antidiscrimination laws, the third problematic conceptual theme in GRC and one that is almost as culturally dense and contested in its meanings as are the concepts of religion and sexuality. Courts have upheld civil rights laws as viewpoint-neutral regulations of conduct rather than expressions of belief, but this understanding runs counter to a massive amount of descriptive commentary, as well as the history and popular discourse of civil rights. The moralistic vision of antidiscrimination law has persisted, even as civil rights laws have expanded to encompass issues directly related to sexuality. This combination draws demands from religious groups for exemptions, including Georgetown in the GRC litigation, on the theory that enforcement of LGBT equality laws creates unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination against conservative religious beliefs. The need for civil rights advocates to mobilize a rhetoric other than moral legitimacy has gone unacknowledged, and I argue that this should become a component of antidiscrimination discourse for the future.
Finally, Part VI interrogates the underlying concept of pluralism. I identify how two inconsistent models using the same nomenclature of pluralism have emerged in Free Exercise scholarship. I critique the newer model, which I characterize as based on the concept of "state as player," under which a truncated state takes a back seat to expansive individualist rights to accommodation of religious beliefs and practices. I endorse the state-as-umpire model, both because it supplies the necessary resolution in a cosmopolitan democracy and because it is the only approach that can effectively protect against the third-party harm that results from exemptions.
Issues related to sexuality constitute a primary site for the negotiation of pluralist values and challenges to those values. The epistemic dynamic is mutually constitutive. Specifically, conflicts surrounding equality rights for openly gay persons will redefine the cultural authority and social role of religious institutions, as they simultaneously affect the meaning of equality.
II. THE GEORGETOWN "GAY RIGHTS CASE": THE PERFECT STORM
In 1978, lesbian, gay and bisexual student groups on the main campus and at the Law Center of Georgetown University sought recognition as official student groups. When the University refused, the student groups filed suit under the D.C. Human Rights Law, which had been amended three years earlier to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by public accommodations, including educational institutions. 20 The University took the position that it could not accede to the D.C. law without acquiescing to coerced speech. It argued that granting official recognition to the gay student groups would communicate the University's endorsement of homosexuality, contrary to Catholic teaching.
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When GRC reached the D.C. Court of Appeals, there was no precedent in the context of LGBT equality for resolving the tension between the nation's dual commitments to equality of persons and tolerance for ideological dispute. In the plurality decision written by Judge Julia Cooper Mack, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled that Georgetown University had to comply with D.C.'s prohibition by furnishing equal material, but not philosophical, support to gay student organizations. 22 The court thus split the atom of tolerance, separating what it described as the material from the expressive components of the antidiscrimination mandate.
The complexity of the issues produced a complex resolution, consisting of seven separate opinions in the final en banc decision, preceded by majority and dissenting opinions from a three-judge panel. 23 Three components of the dispute converged to produce a particularly intense legal and social conflict. First, the dispute required adjudicating between two nomic identity communities, each of which had plausible legal claims. Second, the context of the dispute trenched on the particularly volatile cluster of social meanings surrounding homosexuality. 24 Finally, the doctrinal framework in which the dispute arose was antidiscrimination law, a body of law that is itself not simply a mechanism for determining liability, but is also deeply inflected with suggestions of moral legitimacy. In a reflection of the importance to it of the principles involved, the University sacrificed $200 million in tax-exempt bonds that the District declined to offer while Georgetown was resisting enforcement of the antidiscrimination statute. 25 Ultimately, the University President and Board of Directors acceded to the court's ruling despite pressure from counsel and Cardinal James Hickey to seek further review in the Supreme Court. 26 Had any of these factors not been present, the emotional intensity register of this litigation would have been significantly lower. Even had the dispute been between the same two parties, for example, it would have not become an epic saga lasting a decade and achieving widespread notoriety if the context had been questions of scientific accuracy or if the legal framework had centered on contract or torts. Instead, a trifecta of cultural crisis points melded into a perfect storm. It is a storm that is likely to arise again.
The Georgetown case is conventionally-and not incorrectlyunderstood as a battle of rights in which the liberty of religious expression and belief was pitted against equality claims. A better understanding, however, is that it was a battle of social meanings, or perhaps the first skirmish in one specific, continuing battle. Explicitly at issue in the framing of the parties' claims and defenses, and in the text of the opinion, were the meanings of the act of compliance with an antidiscrimination law, of openly expressed homosexuality, and of the distinction between endorsement and toleration. What is missing from Judge Mack's opinion is a deeper engagement with these social meanings and their legal and social consequences.
A. The Role of Expressive Identity in the Georgetown Case
In a dispute that pits claims of equality against those of religious liberty, the equality claims may arise from the Equal Protection Clause or from civil rights statutes. The religiously-affiliated defendant can disavow liability based on some or all of three branches of First Amendment law: free expression, the freedom of expressive association, and the free exercise of religion. The tests that a court must deploy to apply those defenses collapse into each other. 27 In each, the court must determine whether enforcement of the equality claim would significantly burden the defendant's expression or religious beliefs or the capacity of an organizational defendant to associate for expressive purposes. If a burden is significant, the court must then assess whether there is a compelling state interest in enforcing the equality mandate and whether its interest could be achieved with comparable effectiveness by other means. The weight of the burden on the speaker determines how great the obligation is on the state to justify its action. State action that produces either silencing or coerced speech is generally per se invalid.
This analytic construct structures the dispute in unfortunate ways. It assigns equality interests to one party and expressive liberty interests to the other, when it is almost always true that both sides embody both values. The "equality plaintiff" is in fact communicating a message, and the "expressive defendant" is seeking recognition for the cluster of identity affiliations that produced the point of view it seeks to advance. Despite this complex social dynamic, constitutional doctrine has artificially disaggregated the speaker and the message -a nonsensical result in light of the way that social life is experienced.
In earlier work, I have described how what I have called the concept of expressive identity-the social reality of integration between the identity of the speaker and the viewpoint of her message-has cut across doctrines and confused constitutional law. 28 Both protecting a group of people in a marginalized status category from discrimination and fostering space for anti-orthodoxy messages should be understood as part of the same project of furthering justice. Thus, if an expressive identity-such as "gay" or "Christian"-is to be protected, the scope of the equality protection for each group must include space for incorporating the intrinsic message behind the group identity, rather than allowing the message of either group (whether it is "gay is good" or "homosexual conduct is a sin") to negate the equality mandate.
The anomalies of legal doctrine that underlie the expressive identity conundrum have produced contradictory framings by gay plaintiffs. 29 In First Amendment cases against state actors, LGBT plaintiffs have pressed claims premised on dissent, with self-characterizations of LGBT identity as inherently expressive. In situations such as the Georgetown case, involving private sector defendants, LGBT plaintiffs have downplayed any expressive selfcharacterizations. In that type of case, the clearer the anti-orthodoxy viewpoint of the group of LGBT plaintiffs, the stronger the defense by a private institution that it cannot be dragooned into endorsement of ideas with which it disagrees.
The conundrum of expressive identity fractured the en banc court in GRC. Because GRC involved a private university, the students had no First Amendment claim and the University had no First Amendment obligation. What the Georgetown students did have was the District of Columbia antidiscrimination statute. Two judges asserted that the student groups represented a viewpoint regarding the moral legitimacy of homosexuality, and that the local civil rights law did not require Georgetown to treat all belief-driven groups equally. 30 Judge Mack rejected this argument on the ground that the University had applied anti-LGBT stereotypes in its rationale for non-recognition of the groups, thus placing its policy into the category of status-based discrimination. 31 Without that evidence, however, the group's intrinsic "pro-gay" message could have defeated its claim under the antidiscrimination law. By extension, other openly LGBT persons and organizations could have been left unprotected against exclusions by private entities with an expressive function, as indeed later occurred with the Boy Scouts.
32
Two other members of the court found that the expressive components of openly lesbian, gay, and bisexual identity had to be accepted as part of the equality claim, thus implicitly recognizing and endorsing the expressive identity critique. 33 These judges considered it bogus for Georgetown to claim that its differential treatment of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual students could be separated from the very kind of bias that the antidiscrimination law was enacted to prohibit.
Based on the evidence of stereotyping, Judge Mack's opinion elided the conflict about whether the claim of the LGBT equality organization was better understood as challenging a private institution's hostility to gay students or as challenging the institution's protected right to express antipathy to the idea that homosexuality should be a neutral factor in its operating policies. This elision enabled the court to avoid taking a position on whether the foundation of the gay students group's claim was status or viewpoint. The court thereby ducked the question of the social meaning of toleration of contrary expression by a speaker with a sincere objection to a particular form of equality. The court achieved a compromise between competing normative visions only by avoiding the meaning of those visions.
The conceptual frame of expressive identity seeks to engage head-on with these anomalies. It incorporates these complexities by recognizing that the identity characteristic that grounds any equality claim is in fact an amalgam of status, expression, and often conduct. Religious affiliation and sexual orientation are perhaps the two clearest examples of such an amalgam: each characteristic melds a social demographic, a set of practices and, as Justice Kennedy described religion, "a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered." 34 The conceptual frame of expressive identity thus integrates the expressive aspects of any antidiscrimination claim as intrinsic to, rather than contradictory to, equality norms. In doing so, it offers a realistic appreciation that recognition claims are intrinsically communicative of ideas and beliefs.
The Supreme Court has noted the risk that pretextual claims of shared beliefs by an association could hide discriminatory policies of excluding certain persons. 35 Assessing the sincerity of a group's expressive function can be tricky. In general, I would accord wide latitude for all expressive associations, including those of a religious nature, but I would not eliminate the judicial role of guarding against exemptions that are based on suspiciously recent central beliefs from antidiscrimination laws. As the number of such cases increases, the need increases for greater clarity of analysis as well, something the Court has not yet achieved.
B. Conflicting Views of "Endorsement"
Baked into the problem of expressive identity is the contention that when an institution allows the presence of certain expressive actors, such as openly gay plaintiffs or groups, it is reasonable to infer that the institution has endorsed some variation of the belief that homosexuality is morally or socially acceptable. In the Georgetown case, the University rested its First Amendment defenses most heavily on the argument that recognition of the gay student organizations would be "interpreted by many" as an endorsement of homosexuality by the University. 36 Georgetown thus alleged a burden on its expression rights because of what it asserted was the social meaning of recognizing the gay student groups.
The claim by Georgetown and similar institutions that their own expressive messages have been hijacked and twisted amounts to a spoliation defense-that is, that its religious position on homosexuality is spoiled by the presence of an openly gay student group on campus. My argument, in response, is two-fold. First, I agree that the first part of a proper doctrinal response is to employ an objective test of whether there has been spoliation of the speaker's message. I recognize, however, that objectivity is easier said than done; in a culturally-loaded context such as that in the GRC litigation, objectivity can seem like a chimera. Second, I argue that changing social meanings result in changing the degree of burden on expression (even under a properly objective test) and that this reality must be taken into account in the doctrinal analysis.
In her analysis for the D.C. Court of Appeals, Judge Mack eschewed objectivity. Instead, her opinion deferred to the University on gauging the expressive impact dynamics in the case. Not only did Judge Mack's opinion accept the University's understanding of the content of Roman Catholic tenets on the subject of homosexuality, as it should have, but it also deferred to the University's argument that recognition of a student organization would inevitably communicate endorsement of the activities and beliefs of that student organization. 37 In the University's view, being required to recognize a gay student group, while otherwise taking no position on the group, was equivalent to mandated neutrality by the University regarding the group, which was in turn equivalent to endorsement of the group and hence, of homosexuality. Expert testimony by clergy advanced this argument as part of Roman Catholic doctrine. 38 The University further argued that it would be seen as having endorsed not only the campus activities, but also whatever movement efforts and messages emanated from the entire gay rights movement beyond the campus. 39 The court's acceptance of this analysis led to the conclusion that the D.C. statute could not require the University to recognize the gay student groups without violating the University's First Amendment right against coerced speech.
40 In effect, the court defined a particular religious constituency as the relevant metric for determining the effect of compliance with a civil rights law, rather than the presumptively secular publics of the student body, the faculty, and neutral observers. The result was a fundamentally subjective analysis.
The court accepted this analysis without significant assessment of the reality of the University. Georgetown University is not a congregation or religious order, but a large university that has chosen to function in a national, secular academic environment. It does not limit the faculty, staff or student body by religious affiliation or adherence to tenets of the Roman Catholic faith. It is a full and flourishing member of the intellectual and economic marketplace of higher education. Central to the role of even private universities is their uniquely broad openness to all manner of viewpoints.
It is easy to criticize the finding of an endorsement effect from the perspective of twenty-five years later, all the more so in light of Georgetown's own changes. 41 But, a defender of the decision for its pluralist value might argue, meanings shift; the social meanings of ideas are not frozen. Surely there is no better example of that than debates over equality rights for lesbians and gay men. Gay identity signifies an issue and a group that was once seen as "beyond the 38 pale," 42 but gay equality now harmonizes with civil rights more generally, with increasing success in the political arena. Only two years before the en banc decision, the Supreme Court ruled that same-sex partners had no constitutionally protected right to sexual privacy. 43 Perhaps the contention that gay presence implied endorsement, however strained now, was at least plausibly right then.
Even if we assume for purposes of argument that the court was correct to accept Georgetown's claim that the presence of a gay student group might create the perception that the University endorsed homosexuality or gay rights, the court should not have stopped its analysis there. First Amendment law requires an inquiry into whether the speaker whose message is allegedly being coerced nonetheless has the power to eliminate the distortion of its views by affirmative dis-attribution-i.e., by taking steps to communicate its non-endorsement of certain messages, in ways that will reasonably counter any false perceptions of agreement. 44 The duty to mitigate spoliation of one's message by dissociation from the spoiler provides courts with a mechanism for allocating the burdens of tolerance and dissent in a dispute over expressive space. As cultural shifts alter the perception of endorsement, the burden of disassociation will become lighter.
In GRC, the appellate panel and the en banc court parted ways at this step of the analysis. 45 The panel had accepted, arguendo, Georgetown's fear of a perception of endorsement, but had concluded that there were many mechanisms available to the University for distancing itself from a gay student group and clarifying that it did not accept the group's message. 46 Such actions, the panel reasoned, would mitigate any burden on the University's First Amendment rights.
The en banc court resolved the endorsement/dissociation question in precisely the opposite way. Unlike the panel, the en banc court accepted the trial court's factual finding that the spoliation of the University's message by the gay 42 Gay Students Org. of Univ. of N. H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1974) ("The underlying question, usually not articulated, is whether, whatever may be Supreme Court precedent in the First Amendment area, group activity promoting values so far beyond the pale of the wider community's values is also beyond the boundaries of the First Amendment."). 43 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 (1986) . 44 See infra text accompanying notes 64-67. 45 Compare 536 A.2d at 19 (en banc) with 496 A.2d at 574 (panel). 46 496 A.2d at 580. student group was irreparable. 47 For that reason, Judge Mack's opinion for the en banc court concluded that Georgetown did not need to recognize the student group, although it was required to provide the group with various material supports. Judge Mack's opinion left undecided any issue of disassociation. 48 During settlement agreements following the court's decision, 49 the burden of dissociation eventually came to rest on the student groups, requiring the groups to state affirmatively that, despite their use of the name "Georgetown," there was no official university recognition of the groups. 50 The GRC court's treatment of both prongs of the relevant doctrine was inadequate: it gave short shrift to the need for an objective standard for assessing whether there is perceived endorsement when a university recognizes a student group, and it failed to address a duty of mitigation on the part of the university. In the end, the D.C. court developed its own approach to the allocation of discursive space, but without articulating a coherent rationale to assist courts in later cases.
C. The Role of Antidiscrimination Law in GRC
What no doubt astounded Georgetown University and its lawyers in the 1980's was that their position condemning homosexual conduct, grounded in clear religious doctrine, was seen as only morally equivalent -rather than morally superior-to the implicit normative premise of a statute that forbade differential treatment based on sexual orientation. In its ultimate resolution of the conflict, the D.C. Court of Appeals in effect granted that the University had a moral autonomy right to take a normatively wrong position, but held that the antidiscrimination law constrained the University from imposing material harm as a result of its position. 51 47 536 A.2d at 19. The en banc court declined to review this finding de novo, instead ruling that it was not clearly erroneous. Id. The University's contention was heavily muddied by its simultaneous acceptance of other student groups with messages contradicting Roman Catholic orthodoxy. 496 A.2d at 573-74. In addition, the university never sought to ban gay student groups from campus entirely. Id. at 574. 48 536 A.2d at 14 n.12; id. at 46 (Newman, J., concurring). 49 A Gay Rights Victory at Georgetown, supra note 2. 50 Consent Agreement (on file with author). 51 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
The association of this cluster of moral meanings with antidiscrimination law forms no part of any judicial holding of which I am aware, although the Supreme Court's decision in Bob Jones University v. United States 52 comes close. The Court in Bob Jones held that the public policy against racial segregation was so strong that it trumped the right of a conservative Christian college to maintain a discriminatory admissions policy based on its religious beliefs. 53 Although multiple utilitarian arguments about the value of diversity to the quality of education can justify antidiscrimination requirements, it seems a stretch to imagine that the court would have disallowed a religion-based exception had the only state interest been that of encouraging high standards in university education. Instead, the power of the Bob Jones decision lies in its normative punch.
In GRC, the court addressed the related question of whether the District had a compelling interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination. In the first appellate opinion, the panel held that this goal was equally "'compelling' or 'overriding'" as the interest in eliminating discrimination based on race or sex, and cited Bob Jones as controlling precedent for the proposition that antidiscrimination goals outweighed religious liberty interests.
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Judge Mack, the third member of the original panel, dissented from its judgment in part because she disagreed with this reading of Bob Jones. To her, "the majority's equation" of race and sexual orientation discrimination, in light of the constitutional history associated with the former, was "far-fetched." 55 In her opinion for the full court, Judge Mack walked back the implications of her "farfetched" characterization in a lengthy section of the en banc opinion that recounts the history of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Although it describes such discrimination as an "evil," 56 the court acknowledged approaching this part of its analysis with "more than a little trepidation." 57 Except for a few passing references, 58 the Bob Jones decision is not mentioned.
In the dispute over comparing discrimination based on sexual orientation to that based on race, both sides realized that an important cultural good was at stake. The most valuable resource that Georgetown lost in the GRC litigation was not the avoidance of extending relatively insignificant material benefits to the gay student groups. Rather, its major loss was the exclusivity of its claim to moral superiority in the public sphere, a position that in turn had served to reaffirm the superiority of its private definition of morality.
D. Summary
We have seen in this part how deeply contingent the decision in the Georgetown case was on social meanings in three key dimensions: the expressive connotations of both gay identity and religious affiliation; the contested interpretations of which actions communicate "endorsement" of a position or viewpoint; and the normative implications of a judicial finding that the university violated a civil rights law.
My critique thus far has been primarily doctrinal. Judge Mack and those who have celebrated the decision, however, would doubtless argue that doctrinal deconstruction misses the bigger points: that the court's compromise solution enabled both parties to retain their dignity and fostered future dialogic engagement. In the historical context of the 1980s, this assessment may be correct. But we must also ask how best to protect and foster cultural diversity now.
Beginning in Part IV, infra, I will address broader questions of political theory raised in GRC and similar cases. Before reaching those points, however, it is important to bring the doctrinal analysis up to date.
III. EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE SINCE GRC
Since GRC was decided, the Supreme Court has been forced to confront the same three tensions present in the Georgetown case. The result has been a mixture of partial clarification and uneven reasoning, with patches of emotionalism.
A. Spoliation and Endorsement
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court found that the Scouts' right to expressive association barred New Jersey from applying a law against sexual orientation discrimination in the selection of an assistant scoutmaster. 59 Although Dale can be read as superseding GRC, it can also be distinguished: Dale involved a leadership position in an organization for children and adolescents, rather than the presence of one among many student groups available to young adults in a university setting. What is consistent in both GRC, and Dale, however, is the courts' avoidance of the feasibility of dis-attribution.
The expressive association test that the Court used in Dale asked only what would be the burden of Dale's presence on the Scouts' ability to disseminate their chosen message. The Court deferred, in a perfunctory manner, to the Scouts' assertion that it taught that homosexual conduct is morally wrong and that the presence of a gay assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden its expressive integrity. 60 The primary dissent argued that the Scouts had failed to demonstrate a meaningful burden, both because of lack of evidence that its views on homosexuality were consistent and unequivocal over time and because of the excess significance being accorded to homosexuality. 61 But neither opinion engaged directly the importance of assessing whether the excluder could effectively disassociate itself from the party seeking inclusion. The absence of that step in the doctrinal analysis enabled the majority's too-easy finding of an unconstitutional burden.
Thus, the dissociation point escaped analysis. All of the Justices alluded to changing popular opinion on homosexuality, 62 but none understood why changing popular opinion was relevant. Justice Stevens's references to specific indicia of this change seemed to be intended as a counter to, and a calling-out of, more conservative views as "atavistic." 63 The imprecision of his references elicited distancing comments from his fellow dissenters. Shifts in popular opinion did not, as Justice Souter's separate dissent correctly stated, affect in any way whether the 59 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 60 Id. at 651-52. 61 Id. at 668-78, 696 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 62 Id. at 660, 699-700 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 701 (Souter, J., dissenting). 63 Id. at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Scouts' views were entitled to presumptive protection under the First Amendment. 64 What is important about changes in public opinion regarding LGBT equality is that they reflect shifts in social meaning that undercut the weight of the expressive burden on the Scouts. This dynamic should have been factored into the Court's analysis. The Scouts asserted that including an openly gay Scoutmaster would create the perception that the Scouts endorsed homosexuality, the same argument made by Georgetown. 65 This argument depends on both the assumption that a reasonable observer would draw that conclusion and that there were no effective dissociation steps that the Scouts could take to counter it.
As homosexuality becomes more accepted in the society at large, the reasonable person's interpretation of gay presence changes. The evolving opinions either in favor of or neutral about homosexuality do not disqualify antigay opinion from First Amendment shelter. But they do affect the calculus as to what is a reasonable duty to mitigate by dissociation because they increase the likelihood that such dissociation will be effective. To the extent that efforts to dissociate succeed, the spoliation of the anti-gay speaker's message diminishes.
For these reasons, determining who bears the burden of dissociation or dis-attribution in this situation is critical. For expressive harm as for material harm, the law should place the burden on the party with the greatest capacity to absorb it, generally the party having the greatest capacity to disseminate its own views. If there is risk that reasonable persons would perceive that X's tolerance of Y's presence signals a change in X's worldview, then fashioning a remedy that requires X to generate more expression increases the articulation of both anti-LGBT and pro-LGBT views and strengthens the norm of tolerance.
One could object that to understand legal outcomes as turning on cultural changes is to invite ambiguity and judicial over-reaching. It is precisely the dissociation test that could alleviate that risk, however. Asking whether concrete mechanisms exist by which the excluder could effectively communicate its own views, despite an unwanted expressive identity presence, would constitute a test for allocating the burdens of tolerance and dissent that is far more consistent with norms of both equality and expression than the deference employed by the courts in GRC and Dale.
In two other cases, analogous in different ways to GRC, the Court did employ a dissociation test. Both involved a university that asserted spoliation of expression: that either funding for a student religious group or the presence of military recruiters would undercut the message intended by the university. In Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, a public university argued that paying expenses for a Christian student publication would so distort the university's policy of neutrality that it would create an Establishment Clause violation. 66 In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), a consortium of law schools challenged a statute requiring that military recruiters have equal access to campus placement services. 67 The schools argued that compliance would undercut their policies against allowing entities with discriminatory employment policies to recruit on campus. 68 In both Rosenberger and FAIR, the Court found that the burden on speech could be sufficiently mitigated by university efforts publicizing their own messages of neutrality or commitment to equality, respectively.
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One may argue that Dale and FAIR can be distinguished from each other and from GRC by the particular branch of First Amendment law that was found to be decisive. Both the Scouts and FAIR asserted a combination of expressive association and coerced speech claims. The Court decided Dale on expressive association grounds, and FAIR on coerced speech grounds. For some purposes, the two doctrines appropriately diverge. In expressive association law, and not in coerced speech litigation, the court must inquire as to the bona fides of the expressive characteristics of an organization and whether the views in contention have in fact been consistently, repeatedly expressed. 70 For the individual or organization claiming that expression is being commandeered in service of a particular message, the history of past views is largely irrelevant.
But both are branches of law in service of the same principles. When there is a conflict in rights, as there is in claims to inclusion in a venue that is itself communicative, the same balancing of expressive burdens should attach. The question of whether the impact on the message of the excluder can be mitigated by reasonable steps to dissociate from the intruder should factor into both analyses. The outcomes in both categories of cases should foster the purposes and normative values of freedom of both expression and equality.
B. Untangling Expressive Identity
The most recent case in which the Supreme Court has directly grappled with the expressive identity conundrum is Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. 72 a norm-driven expressive association that excluded persons based on the particular combination of beliefs, status and conduct that antidiscrimination laws have treated as sexual orientation. In its reasoning, the Court acknowledged the expressive aspects of conflicting identities more directly than it ever had before
In CLS, the Court considered antidiscrimination claims by a conservative religious student group that challenged the policy of a public university limiting recognition to organizations that allowed all students to participate in all recognized organizations. CLS argued that denying it recognition constituted a viewpoint-based exclusion from a limited public forum, in violation of its expressive association rights. CLS contended that its policy of excluding thoseincluding lesbian, gay, and bisexual students-who did not comport with its philosophy that only heterosexual intimacy within marriage could be moral amounted to limiting membership eligibility based on viewpoint. In any event, CLS argued, it did not discriminate based on the per se status of sexual orientation.
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Faced with this Boy Scouts-like argument, the Court distinguished the case from Dale because the right of CLS to continue its membership policies without recognition as a student group was not in question. CLS had other options. 74 The majority declined to attempt to disaggregate the components of expressive identity. Nonetheless, the five majority Justices acknowledged that these 71 characteristics congealed into one meaningful concept of identity. In that, they were joined, albeit backhandedly, by the dissent.
The Boy Scouts Redux Strategy
CLS is an association of law students and lawyers with chapters at a number of law schools. When the Hastings College of Law chapter of CLS sought official university recognition, it was denied on the ground that CLS violated the Hastings requirement that recognition would not be granted to student organizations that discriminated based on certain specified grounds, including sexual orientation. During the litigation, Hastings specified that the nondiscrimination requirement also meant that student organizations had to accept all students as participants, members, or leaders "regardless of their status or beliefs." 75 Hastings took no position on the morality of any form of sexual conduct.
CLS refused membership to anyone who disagreed with its belief that "sexual activity should not occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman . . . [including] anyone who engages in unrepentant homosexual conduct."
76 When its request for official student organization status was denied on the ground that it violated the antidiscrimination policy, CLS contended that the state through its public university was prohibited from penalizing CLS's right of expression and association based on a requirement of equal treatment that conflicted with the organization's views on sexual morality.
" [T] his is an a fortiori case under Dale," CLS argued, 77 citing the Scouts' right to exclude Dale because his inclusion would subvert the Scouts' right to express its view that homosexuality was incompatible with Scouting. Like the Scouts, CLS emphasized, it too based its exclusionary policy on its beliefs. Therefore, it could not be required to admit all comers, including those who manifestly disagreed with its philosophy, a group that included, but was not limited to, lesbian, gay, and bisexual students. CLS asserted that it could not 75 effectively continue to communicate its viewpoint if it was forced to accept members who disagreed.
The Court rejected the argument. Agreeing that the "First Amendment shields CLS against state prohibition of the organization's expressive activity," the Court nonetheless ruled that, while the holding in Dale fell within the scope of that principle, the facts in CLS did not. 78 At issue was not a prohibition of expression but the denial of a form of public subsidy. Using the all-comers policy as the basis for subsidy decisions was justified, the Court found, as a reasonable way to administer the system of student organizations.
Hinting at Expressive Identity
The CLS litigation was complicated by a dispute over whether Hastings had in fact relied on an all-comers requirement to deny recognition or whether the denial was based on solely the antidiscrimination mandate. If the latter, CLS contended that other student groups were allowed to exclude based on viewpoint, and that it, as a religious organization, was singled out as ineligible to control its membership in that way. Chief Justice Roberts was sympathetic to the ramifications:
[G]ender or race is fundamentally different from religious [belief] . Gender and race is a status.
[sic] Religious belief, it has to be based on the fundamental notion that we are not open to everybody. We have beliefs, you have to subscribe to them. And we have always regarded that as a good thing.
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In the trial court, the parties had stipulated that to secure formal status, a student group had to allow "any student" to participate, using as an example that a Democratic club had to admit Republicans. 80 Hastings denied the allegation that the all-comers policy was not being enforced or that CLS was turned down on other grounds. 81 In the Supreme Court, however, CLS argued that the earlier version of the policy had been applied, that prohibited discrimination but did apply the all-comers policy in all instances and that, in any event, both versions of the policy were unconstitutional. Based on the stipulation, Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court analyzed only the all-comers policy, accepting that it was applied equally to all student groups. In response to the CLS argument that even with an accept-allcomers policy, Hastings had a constitutional obligation to allow viewpoint-based exclusions for a viewpoint-based group, the Court demurred from imposing such a difficult enforcement task on the university. The CLS demand that "Hastings permit exclusion because of belief but forbid discrimination due to status . . . would impose on Hastings a daunting labor. How should the Law School go about determining whether a student organization cloaked prohibited status exclusion in belief-based garb?"
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The majority opinion implied that viewpoint was inseparable from identity or status, at least for a religious group. The Court acknowledged the assertion by CLS that it did not "exclude individuals because of sexual orientation, but rather 'on the basis of a conjunction of conduct and the belief that the conduct is not wrong.'" 83 In the next sentence rebutting the point, the Court substituted "status" for "the belief that the conduct is not wrong": "Our decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context." 84 Fairly read, the two sentences strongly suggest recognition that the concept of "status" encompasses a message that one believes that the conduct defining the status is moral. This precise combination constitutes expressive identity.
Justice Stevens, in concurrence, went further and argued explicitly that the identity status associated with religious affiliation or homosexuality necessarily and correctly incorporates viewpoint. 85 He more clearly recognized the category of expressive identity but without labeling it as such. He agreed with the main opinion as to the validity of the all-comers policy, but also found that Hastings could have enforced a ban on sexual orientation discrimination against a religious student group, even if other clubs were allowed to limit membership based on a shared philosophy. To do otherwise, he said, would eviscerate the goal of barring status-based discrimination: "A person's religion often simultaneously constitutes or informs a status, an identity, a set of beliefs and practices, and much else besides. (So does sexual orientation for that matter . . .) ."
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The four dissenting Justices would have found both versions of the policy unconstitutional. The original policy, Justice Alito wrote, constituted viewpointbased discrimination because its effect was to bar only religious groups from excluding members who did not share their beliefs, and because it discriminated against groups, like CLS, that expressed a viewpoint on sexual morality not shared by the University. 87 Implicitly, this opinion also grasped the basic truth behind the concept of expressive identity: that social identity is too capacious to be distilled into two pure categories, one status, one viewpoint. Although the members of the court diverged over how to apply the insight, they appear to have all agreed that sexual orientation and religion both exemplify this concept.
Justice Alito concluded that, even if the viewpoint was neutral on its face, the all-comers policy was adopted as a pretext for discriminating against the religious group. 88 His dissent raised the question to which we will return in Part IV: whether antidiscrimination policies, when enforced against religious entities on behalf of gay plaintiffs, are themselves the reflection of bias. Four members of the Court appeared ready to adopt the CLS argument that enforcement of the antidiscrimination policy created a disparate negative impact on religious entities that express a belief that homosexual conduct is morally wrong.
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C. Summary
The law's treatment of expressive identity remains unclear. The Supreme Court has both declined to factor in the duty to dissociate when the presence of an equality claimant would arguably spoil the message of an expressive institution (Dale), and has also insisted on such a duty (FAIR). The Court has recognized the complexities of the combined and mutually reinforcing effects of conduct, status, and viewpoint. As with the ambivalent guidance regarding a duty to dissociate, however, it has not clarified a mode of analysis for expressive identity claims.
IV. THE ROLE OF COURTS IN A KULTURKAMPF
In the wake of backlash that is often mobilized around the theme of "judicial activism," American courts and scholars have sought shelter in a renewed emphasis on the virtues of judicial modesty and restraint. Especially but not only in cases that arouse strong public reactions, there is broad agreement that courts should rely on a minimalist or passive approach to adjudication. 90 LGBT equality cases provide a particularly stark challenge to judges, one that has literally threatened the judicial function by producing election campaigns against judges who have voted to legalize same-sex marriage.
91
Judicial minimalism is the jurisprudence of pluralism, providing a buffer zone both for the interest groups involved and for the judges themselves. It functions as a philosophical speed bump, a warning that courts should proceed with prudence and caution when a dispute enters the field of highly contested religious and moral values. More deeply, the underlying goal of minimalism is to enhance the processes of democratic deliberation by which such issues can be resolved by politically accountable decision makers, outside the often zero-sum world of litigation.
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Judge Mack's opinion in GRC is a model of such minimalism. It rejected the all-or-nothing litigation posture of the parties in GRC, and deployed several standard techniques for "leaving things undecided": emphasizing statutory rather than constitutional grounds, limiting the resolution to the distinctive facts of the particular set of circumstances, and eschewing the announcement of broad rules for future cases. Its result was to foster dialogic engagement between the parties: in fact, they negotiated a settlement agreement that embodied the principles of the decision. Since that time, conditions for LGBT students at Georgetown have greatly improved.
The value of judicial minimalism in a constitutional democracy is selfevident but not unmixed. Moreover, "maximalism" is not the only alternative. Rather than broad pronouncements of principles to govern future cases, courts could deploy much more focused burden-shifting mechanisms. In this Part, I identify three broader principles that would decrease the ambiguous nature of minimalism-driven results without sacrificing the advantages of judicial restraint. The duty to dissociate discussed above is one such specific doctrinal device. Consider the following to be a suggestion for judicial minimalism 2.0.
A. Civil Obedience
One problem circulating in the background of religious liberty defenses to equality claims is that changes in social meaning can and do produce changes in law, and thus can be decisive of legal disputes. Neutral principles are not unchanging principles. The facts in GRC illustrate it well: as we have seen, Georgetown asserted that its recognition of the gay students groups would have created the perception, at least in the minds of some, that the university endorsed homosexuality, thus spoiling its own message. I have suggested that this was not an unreasonable claim 30 years ago when the case was being litigated, although it would be today. I have also argued that the D. C. Court of Appeals was nonetheless mistaken in its analysis of endorsement because it did not explore the means available to the University to cure any spoliation by affirmative disattribution.
But there is a more fundamental criticism that relates to the expressive functions of law. Georgetown's argument depended on the premise that compliance with a law of general application sends any message at all. The relevant baseline question should be not whether voluntary university recognition would have created a perception of endorsement, but whether mandated compliance with a law would have created such a perception.
To analyze whether the extent of the burden on religion caused by obedience with a law is justified, courts examine the state's interest in enacting the law. The Supreme Court has found that some burdens are not justified 94 and that other burdens are overridden by the public interest served by the law. 95 The to nonprofit entities. 108 The Court specifically disavowed "the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction."
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It is too early to know whether the decision in Hobby Lobby will prove to be as exotic as these limitations suggest or will come to be seen as the camel's nose under the tent. The limitation to race discrimination as the barrier against pretext is deeply disturbing at best. The excess significance of sexuality in the construction of definitions of morality should not so easily lead to a different result than in race-related cases.
B. Voice, Not Exit
The second principle that should guide courts in culturally volatile cases such as GRC builds on the first. If obeying a generally applicable law does not communicate a message, an objecting individual has two options. The first option is voice; the second is exit. In adjudicating such disputes, judges should interpret doctrine and fashion remedies with the goals of fostering voice and discouraging exit.
By voice, I mean that that the individual or entity complying with an antidiscrimination law can actively express its disagreement with the implicit message of such a law-e.g., the message that sexual orientation is a morally neutral characteristic and that discrimination on that basis is wrong. The voice in this situation is the voice of dissent. The second option-exit-can take multiple forms. It may result in civil disobedience or in withdrawal from the activities being regulated, as when Catholic adoption agencies have ceased providing services to government agencies rather than comply with an antidiscrimination law.
In effect, the consequence of treating civil obedience as non-expressive is to allocate the burden of dissent (or exit) onto the civil rights objector. Ironically, the burden and right of dissent, should the party exercise it, constitutes a form of coming out-in this instance coming out as an objector to the antidiscrimination message embodied in a majoritarian law.
Consider the subtle but important difference that this allocation of burden would have made in GRC. What actually occurred, after the litigation ended, was that the gay student groups agreed to include statements in their publications that the University did not endorse the positive views toward homosexuality that the student group communicated. There is a whiff of shaming in this result. By contrast, had the University stated in relevant materials that it did not endorse the views of the gay student groups (or, more appropriately, of any student groups), the implicit positioning would have signaled that Georgetown was the entity that needed to dissent, that antidiscrimination was the norm. Requiring Georgetown to state its own position would not have disrespected that position, but it would have aligned the remedy with the fact that the D.C. antidiscrimination statute had shifted the baseline norm.
There are other advantages to structuring a remedy that allocates the burden to dissent in this way. It furthers an important goal of pluralist governance, which is to enliven the diversity of viewpoints available in the culture. Rather than suppress opposition to an antidiscrimination mandate, such a remedy facilitates it.
One may object that pressuring an organizational or institutional dissenter to express its views more publicly could have the disadvantage of making internal change slower and more difficult. If an institutional dissenter is forced to dig in its heels and defend its opposition to a civil rights law, the ideological diversity within the group may diminish, leading to less willingness to change. While I acknowledge this risk, it seems to me that a mark of greater respect for the dissenter's position is to allow such change to occur, or not, against the backdrop of greater transparency of the views being espoused.
The compromise result that the GRC court fashioned is understandable, given the appropriate desire to preserve the dignity of both parties. But there is a better and more focused principle than minimalism or pluralism for courts to use as guidance: the goal of fostering voice and discouraging exit.
C. Protecting Dissent
The final component of the adjudicatory principles that I offer here can be stated simply: together with a goal of enhancing dissent and discouraging exit comes the concomitant responsibility of courts to protect the right of dissent to which objectors are entitled. When popular opinion is changing, the pressure to conform to suddenly reversed norms can be harsh.
In Okwedy v. Molinari, 110 for example, the Second Circuit correctly accorded scope for dissent from antidiscrimination norms. In that case, a church had contracted with a commercial vendor of billboard space to display a Bible verse condemning homosexuality in Staten Island, New York. Soon after the billboards were posted, the vendor received a letter from the Borough President stating that the display "conveys an atmosphere of intolerance which is not welcome in our borough . . . [P]lease contact . . . my legal counsel . . . to discuss further the issues I have raised in this letter."
111 The vendor removed the signs. When the church and its pastor sued, the district court dismissed their First Amendment claims on the grounds that the Borough President did not have regulatory authority over the vendor and that his letter merely called for dialogue rather than threatening economic retribution. 112 The Second Circuit reversed, finding a sufficient basis for inferring threats by a public official, even if not of official power, to require that the claims be reinstated.
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A situation such as the use of public billboards presents the easiest case for recognizing the importance of the First Amendment rights of those who oppose LGBT equality, because it raises no problems of captive or susceptible audiences or the potential for workplace disruption. Even in situations in which those other concerns are present, however, courts need to exercise special care to ensure that enforcement of antidiscrimination laws and norms does not silence the voices of those who disagree.
In Good News Employee Association v. Hicks, members of an employee group posted notices in the workplace describing the organization as "a forum for people of Faith to express their views on . . . . the Natural Family, Marriage and Family values [sic] ." 114 The employer, a public agency, removed the flyers on the ground that the language was homophobic and could promote harassment based on sexual orientation, a result upheld by the trial and appellate courts. The district court acknowledged that this was a close case: on the one hand, the employer had an independent right to prevent disruption in the workplace and there had been a complaint; on the other hand, the language was not inflammatory and only one complaint had been filed. 115 On balance, the court found that group had only a de minimis protectable right to post messages when regulation of the system properly lay in the employer's discretion.
In my view, this was too narrow a view of the rights of the conservative employees' group. The language of its flyer was too mild, and the principle of protecting dissent too important, to justify the removal. Although the context was a workplace, where other employees are to some extent a captive audience, a flyer on a bulletin board is not difficult to ignore, and there was no evidence that the group's message was targeted to specific individuals.
The school T-shirt cases present the most difficult situations to assess, because the context involves minors and schools' appropriate desire to insulate them from messages that might impair the learning environment even without causing measurable disruption. There is no easy way to distinguish between "homosexuality is shameful," 116 "straight pride," 117 and "be happy, not gay."
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As Judge Posner noted, derogatory comments about "a sexual orientation that deviates from the norm . . . can strike a person at the core of his being [, especially] adolescent students." 119 On that basis, one can distinguish reasonable policies by school officials that suppress speech that, in a different context, would be entitled to First Amendment protection.
D. Summary
In sum, this Part argues for an alternative to supplement the privileging of judicial minimalism as a mechanism for enhancing cultural pluralism. A threepart set of interpretive devices-treating civil obedience as non-expressive, allocating the burden of dissent from the message of antidiscrimination laws to 115 those who object to those laws, and stringently protecting those rights to dissentwill preserve dignity rights on both sides while better aligning with the goal of achieving equality. These interpretive principles should form part of pluralist jurisprudence.
V. CIVIL RIGHTS MORALISM
Because both sexuality and religious liberty are so morally charged, so intrinsically infused with normative constructs, disputes in which the two sets of rights are pitted against each other are especially revealing of fissures in the meaning of antidiscrimination law. On one hand, this branch of law is treated as a viewpoint-neutral regulatory mechanism for equalizing opportunity in economic markets and civil society. On the other hand, more informally but with comparable frequency, courts describe antidiscrimination law in openly expressive and specifically moralistic terms. When antidiscrimination law covers a form of stigmatized sexuality, the two cultural meanings of this type of law clash, sometimes in rhetorically violent terms.
The idea of racial equality has become a core principle in the American narrative of progress, embedded alongside the belief that whatever can be correctly categorized as racist behavior is intrinsically morally wrong. The origins of what I would call civil rights moralism are understandable, and even noble.
The civil rights movement for racial equality, especially as it emerged in the South, steadfastly linked itself to a broadly envisioned concept of Christian ethics, amplified by the prophetic traditions within African-American Protestantism. Invoking "the Supreme Court, the Constitution, and God Almighty" as a seamless conjoined authority created a powerful message for the movement both externally and internally. 120 The gestalt of civil rights organizing was "a part of the historical tradition of religious revivals as much as it [ 123 Yet that framing leads directly to its own reaction.
Religious conservatives argue that a sincere belief in the moral evil of homosexuality could not possibly constitute a civil rights violation in a universe of meanings in which a violation of civil rights is itself morally wrong. To the observant adherent of traditionalist conservative Christianity or the other western faiths, both could not be true. 124 The dilemma of civil rights moralism arises from disbelief that condemnation of evil can encompass both the wrong of bigotry and the wrong of homosexuality.
For some religious conservatives, the possibility that Bob Jones could be applied in a LGBT equality context as the GRC panel did -to forbid a religious institution from engaging in a practice that is core to its faith -leads the parade of horribles to be feared from the acceptance of marriage equality. 125 The most common rejoinder-that Bob Jones is an outlier decision unlikely to be applied outside the context of race-fails to grapple with what a future court could plausibly do. 
